Michigan Law Review
Volume 45

Issue 4

1947

APPLICATION OF FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX
LAWS TO COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Willard S. Pedersen
Member of Washington Bar

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift
Commons

Recommended Citation
Willard S. Pedersen, APPLICATION OF FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX LAWS TO COMMUNITY
PROPERTY, 45 MICH. L. REV. (1947).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol45/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1 947]

COMMUNITY PROPERTY TAXATION

APPLICATION OF FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX LAWS TO COMMUNITY PROPERTY

Willard S. Pedersen*

I
INTRODUCTION

T

HE ganancial or community concept of property ownership, by
which husband and wife have equal, vested, undivided, one-half
interests in property held by them as tenants in community,1 has been
a thorn in the side of federal tax laws 2 ever since some tax-conscious
community income earner decided to report as taxable only one-half
of the community income, leaving the other half to be reported by and
taxed to his wife upon her separate return. Such procedure first became authorized in community property jurisdictions recognizing the
wife's interest as "vested" in 1920.3 Not long thereafter the realization
began to dawn upon "outsiders" that residents of community property
jurisdictions were enjoying distinct tax advantages not available to
them, and from that moment to the present day, criticism of the tax
effect of community property laws has been frequent.4 That the tax
laws have operated favorably upon earners of community income is an
indictment of the federal tax statutes rather than of the community
property laws. This is especially evident when it is realized that in all
jurisdictions except two,5 community property laws were in force long
before the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
adopted. 8

1

A. Examples of Savings to Community Property Owners
Specific illustrations of tax savings available to earners of income
in community property states, as contrasted to similar earners of income in non-community property states, are included in a table which

* A.B., LL.B., University of Washington; LL.M., University of Michigan;
Member of Washington Bar.
1
I DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, §§ I, 97, 105, 239
(1943); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
2 I PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION,§ 1.09 (1942).
8 Infra, note 3 I.
~ 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF CoMMUNITY PROPERTY, § 238 (1943); Community Property Laws as Determinable Factors in Federal Income Taxation, 40 ILL.
L. REV. 136 (1945).
a Oklahoma; Territory of Hawaii.
6
See infra, notes 27 and 28, and discussion pertaining thereto.

'
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is a part of the report of the Senate Committee on Finance on the
Revenue Bill of 1941.7 Reference to it reveals that, using the 1941
Revenue Bill rates, an individual with a net income of $5,ooo would
save $45 federal income tax solely by reason of being a resident of a
community property state; that an individual with an income of
$rn;ooo would save $340; that a person with an income of $30,000
would save $3,351; and that a resident with a $500,000 income would
benefit in the SUIIl of $28,701 federal income tax.
While the favored position of the community property owners
was most apparent when applied to the income tax, the same concept of
property law when applied to estate and gift taxes permitted similar
tax economies.8 However, as is later noted, the Revenue Act of 1942
changed the rule with respect to these latter taxes.9

B. Attempts to Change the Rule as to Income Taxes
It is not surprising that vigorous efforts to eliminate this preferential income tax position have been made, not entirely without effect.
The attacks oh the right of community property spouses to divide
their income and report and pay the tax thereon indiyidually have taken
both legislative and judicial forms. 10 Suggested legislative changes
have embodied both direct attempts to tax community incom~ to the
spouse having its management and control, and indirect attempts such
as requiring mandatory joint returns by spouses in all states, thus taxing
the income of each husband and wife as a unit. Proposals of the former
type were made· in coni:iection with the Revenue Acts of 1921, 1924,
1934 and 1941, whereas mandatory joint returns were suggested at
hea_rings on the Revenue Acts of 1934, 1937 an?- 1941. While all
such attempts have been unsuccessful thus far, the following excerpt
from the report of the Senate Committee on Finance on the Revenue
Bill of 1941 may be indicative of future attitudes should the matter
again be presented:
"4. Community Income.-Ever since the advent of the
income tax, the disparity in taxation of income in the communityS. Rep. 673, Part I, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941) p. 9 et seq.
Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264, 58 S. Ct. 880 (1938); Letter of Deputy
Commissioner Bliss regarding gift taxes, infra, note Io 5.
9
See discussion commencing on pages 428 and 437.
10 Ray, "Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation of Community Property: Income
Tax," 30 CAL. L. REv. 397 (1942); Latc~am, "Invasion of Community Property
Income Tax Privileges," 20 WASH. L. REV. 44 (1945); 462 CCH STAND. FED. TAX
REP. U455.061.
7

8
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property States as compared with that in non-community-property
States has caused considerable concern. This situation has become
more accentuated as the graduated surtax rates have been increased from time to time. Married persons in community-property States under existing law are able to effect substantial tax
savings as compared with married persons in other States. Remedies for this inequitable situation have been frequently recommended to the Congress by the Treasury Department and by
various other tax experts. With the substantial increases in the
surtax rates contained in the bill, these inequities become more
apparent and their termination more desirable....
"Not only does this tax saving benefit only a few individuals
in the community-property States, but, less than I percent of the
total returns filed in the country represent community-property
returns." 11
Along with the proposed legislative changes, judicial criticism of
the rule was not infrequent, reaching its climax in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Douglas in the case of Commissioner v. Harmon. 12 In part,
he stated as follows:
"The federal income tax law makes a discrimination in favor
of the community property states. . . . That discrimination has ,
become increasingly sharp as surtax rates have increased. The
source of that discrimination is to be found in the decisions of this
Court.
"Those decisions are best illustrated by Poe v. ·seaborn, 282
U.S. IOI, which involved the community property system of the
State of Washington. They held that the husband need pay the
federal income tax on only one-half of his salary and other income
from the community, since the other half of those earnings from
their very inception belonged to his wife. The collector had argued that the control exercised by the husband over the community
was sufficient to make him liable for the tax on the full amount.
That result had indeed been indicated by Mr. Justice Holmes
speaking for the Court in United States v. Robbins, 369 U.S.
315,327. And it has been strongly urged that our recent decisions
such as Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, and Harrison v.
Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579-make for the same result. But in Poe
v. Seaborn and related cases the Court discarded that test. It was
11

Report of Senate Committee on Finance on Revenue Bill of 1941, S. Rep. 673,
77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941) p. 9.
12
323 U.S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944). See pages 420, 421 for further discussion
of this case.
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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

' [Vol 45

more concerned with legal doctrine than it was with economic
· realities. It held that the wife's interest in the community (including the husband's salary) was 'vested' and that therefore the
~usband need pay the federal income tax on only half of that
mcome.
"I do not mean to defend Poe v. Seaborn. I only say that if
we are to stand by it, we should not allow it to become a 'vested'
interest of only a few of the States. The truth of the matter is that
Lucas v. Earl and H elvering v. Clifford on the one hand and Poe
v. Seaborn on the other state competing theories of income tax
liability. Or to put it another way, Poe v. Seaborn has been carved
out as an exception to the general rules of liability for income
taxes .... If we adhere to it, we should apply it without discrimination. If we are not to apply it equally to all States, we should
be rid of it. This is the time to face the issue squarely." 13
In harmony with this dissent, some writers have stated 14 that a
decision of Poe v. Seaborn 15 today would very likely be against the
interests of the community property jurisdictions.

C. Estate and Gift Tax Amendments 16
While attempts to change the rule as to income taxes have proved
unavailing-perhaps due to the efforts of "the' solid phalanx of sixteen
complacent senators" 17 from community property states--success was
, finally achieved in the fields of federal estate and gift taxes. Section
402(b)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1942,18 effective on October 22,
1942, added a provision to the estate tax law requiring the inclusion in
the gross estate of a deceased spouse, of the value at the time of his
death of all propetty held as community property, except such part
as is shown to have stemmed from the personal efforts of the surviving
spouse. In all cases, however, there must be included as a minimum,
the value of that portion of the community property over which the
deceased had power of testamentary disposition. The purpose of this
amendment was stated in a Report of the House Committee on Ways
18

Id. at 49-51, 56.
Altman, "Community Property in Peril," 19 TAXES 262 at 264 (1941); 3
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 19.01 (1942); I PAUL, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND G1FT TAXATION, § 1.09 at p. 62 (1942); Ray, "Proposed Changes in
Federal Taxation of Community Property: Income Tax," 30 CAL. L. REv. 397 at 407
14

(1942).
n 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
16

See discussion of amendments at pages 428 and 439 respectively.
GRISWOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION 427 (1940).
18 I.R.C. § 8II(e)(2).
17
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and Means, thus: "This section eliminates special estate tax privileges
enjoyed by residents of community property jurisdictions...." 19 Just
how successfully this purpose has been achieved is commented upon
below.20
An amendment to the gift tax law was likewise included in the
Revenue Act of r942. Section 453 of that act,21 effective January r,
r943, provides that gifts of community property shall be considered
gifts by the husband except to the extent that they may be shown to
have been derived from amounts received by the wife as compensation
for personal services or from her separate property.

D. What is Community Property?
It is not the purpose of this paper to consider problems concerning
the nature of community property. But, to understand the impact of
community property concepts upon federal income, estate and gift taxes,
some understanding of the theory of community property ownership
is necessary, and a few brief comments are therefore appropriate.
de Funiak defines community property as that which husband and wife
own in common, by halves,22 consisting primarily of property earned
or received by them during coverture. The recent case of Fernandez
rv. Wiener 23 referred to the community property laws of the state of
Louisiana in this language:
"By the laws of Louisiana, every marital status subject to the
laws of the state superinduces a partnership or community of the
spouses with respect to property in the state acquired during the
life of the community, unless there be at the time of the marriage
a stipulation to the contrary. All earnings and all property acquired by the husband or wife during the life of the community
becomes community property. . . . It is said that all property
acquired by the spouses during the marriage which falls into the
community is 'due to the joint or common efforts, labor, industry,
economy and sacrifices of the husband and wife,' and that for this
reason the husband and wife each has at all times an equal present
interest in an undivided half of the whole community." 24
The most significant characteristics of community property relate
19

CCH INHERITANCE, EsTATE AND G1FT

20

TAX

SERv., FED.,

7th ed.,

1f 3448.50.

Infra, page 433, § 2.
21
I.R.C. § 10oo(d).
22
23

SERv.,
2

'

l DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY,

340, 66 s. Ct. 178, CCH
FED., 7th ed., 1f 10,239 (1945).
Id. at 348.
326

U.S.

§

l

(1943).

INHERITANCE, ESTATE AND GIFT

TAX
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to the concept of the wife's ownership. In two respects her rights differ
materially from those of a wife in a common law state. First, as noted
before, she has a "vested interest" equal to that of her husband, in all
community property. Second, her interest is devisable and descendible
on her death, just as is that of her husband. 25
·
In all community property jurisdictions except Idaho, Louisiana,
Texas, Hawaii, and possibly Oklahoma, the income from separate
property is the separate property of its owner, regardless of the fact
that it was acquired during<marriage. In Idaho, Louisiana, and Hawaii,
income from separate property becomes community property of the
spouses. This would appear to be true also under the Oklahoma statute.
In Texas, income from separate property, except increase in lands, is
community income.2u
Community property is not, as facetious comment would lead one
to believe, a device designed by the unconscionable to accomplish tax
evasion. On -the contrary it is as old as, nay even older than, the common law itself! Of civilian origin and very largely a Spanish concept
as it developed in the United States, its roots according to de Funiak 21
can be traced back as far as 693 A.D. in Spain, and, according to McKay,28 traces were found in legislation enacted in the reign of Euric
of the Goths, in Spain, A.D. 466 to A.D. 485. Its origin in the United
States can be traced to the Spanish possessions which included the
territory now comprising the states of Arizona, California, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico and Texas. The•first Cod~ of Louisiana was said
to have furnished much of the material for the codes subsequently
adopted in Texas and California, which, in turn, were the models for·
the Arizona, Idaho, Nevada and Washington codes. New Mexico's·
code was believed patterned after a later form of the California sys'
tem. 20
E. Community Property Jurisdictions
At present community property laws are in effect in the following
states and territories of the United States: Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Washington and
Territory of Hawaii.

1f I (1943).
See CCR 1946 FED, TAX GumE, 1f1f 8952-8996.
27 .1 PRINCIPLES OF CoMMUNITY PROPERTY, 1f 2 (1943) ;, see also id.,
28
COMMUNITY PROPERTY, § 9 (1925).
29
Id., § 6.
25 I DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY,

26

c,

2,
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II
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS TO
COMMUNITY PROPERTY

A. In General
" .•• It is perhaps unfortunate that the tax law in this field
was made in a climate of judicial opinion which has remarkably
changed in recent days." 80
In the interests of clarity, let it be said again that the tax rule currently applied to all community income is that, because the non-earning
spouse has therein a present, vested and equal ownership with that of
the earning spouse, such income is reportable and income-taxable in
halves upon the separate returns of each of the spouses.
Authority for this procedure can be traced to a ruling of United
States Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on September rn, r 920,
wherein he advised the Secretary of the Treasury that "the earnings
of husband and wife domiciled in Texas are community income, and
such husband and wife in rendering separate income-tax returns may
each report as gross income one-half of the total earnings of the 1husband and wife." 81
Shortly thereafter official advice was again requested by the Secretary of the Treasury concerning income taxation of community property
spouses, this time as to the application of the rule in other community
property jurisdictions. Attorney General Palmer ruled 82 that the right
to divide and report by halves was applicable to all other community
property jurisdictions 88 with the exception of California. The State of
Californ,ia was excluded because, under the decisions of the Supreme
Court of that state, the wife had no present, vested interest in community property, but a mere expectancy, receiving her half interest
upon the husband's death, as his heir.u
The situation remained in this condition until the disturbing case
of United States v. Robbins 85 was decided on January 4, 1926. There
was much in that opinion to indicate that the Supreme Court was not
satisfied with the "vested interest" test as determinative of the right of
the non-earning spouse to report and pay income tax on one-half of
80

§ 1.09 at p. 62 (1942).
32 Op. Atty. Gen. 298 at 308.
82
February 26, 1921, 32 Op. Atty. Gen. 435.
88
Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Washington.
84
Further discussion, in connection with note 44 infra, relates to this point.
85
269 U.S. 3 I 5, 46 s. Ct. 148.
81

PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G1FT TAXATION,
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the total income of the earning spouse. This opinion could not fail to
create indecision on the part of the Treasury Department, and as a
direct result, on February 3, 1926, the department requested of the
Attorney General a reconsideration of the two previous opinions. The
answer was not forthcoming for a year and a half, but on July 16, 1927
a decision was made withdrawing the previous opinions and leaving
the way open for the prosecution of "test cases in the courts." 86 The
result was the much cited case of Poe v. Seaborn, 81 '"Magna Charta'
for community-income division in all the community property states
but California." 38 Husband a'nd wife, residents of the State of Washington, had each returned one-half of the total community income as
gross income and each deducted one-half of the community expenses to
arrive at the net income returned. The commissioner levied an additional
assessment against the husband, maintaining that all the income should
have been reported in his return. The husband, paying under protest,
filed a claim for refund, and on its rejection brought suit for recovery,
relying on the theory that the test of taxability of income was ownership; that the husband and wife each had a present, vested one-half
interest in community income; and that therefore they could report
and pay by halves. The commissioner, on the other hand, asserted a
theory advanced in the previously decided case of United States v.
Robbins,89 that tax law is not concerned with technical legal titles; that
a realistic analysis reveals that the "control" of a husband over comm,unity property is tantamount to the "ownership" of a husband in a
non-community property state. In support of this theory the commissioner pointed to ·the husband's managerial powers over community
property, so broad, he asserted, as virtually to amount to absolute dom1mon.
In rejecting the commissioner's argument the Court seized upon
what is believed to be the significant fact concerning the husband's right
to control, so often overlooked by courts steeped in common law principles. It said:

a

''We think . . . this contention [ of the commissioner] is unsound. The community must act through an agent. This Court
has said with respect to the community property system (Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 494) that 'property acquired during
86

3 5 Op. Atty. Gen. 26 5 at 269.
282 U.S. IOI, 51 s. Ct. 58 (1930).
88
Oliver, "Community Property and the Taxation of Family Income," 20
TEXAS L. REv. 532 at 539 (1942).
89
269 U.S. 315, 46 S. Ct. 148 (1926). Case reviewed infra, page 418.
87
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marriage with community funds became an acque~ of the community and not the sole property of the one in whose name the
property was bought, although by the law existing at the time the
husband was given the management, control and power of sale of
such property.' This right being vested in him, not because he was
the exclusive owner, but because by law he was created the agent
of the community." 40
Thus the Court, rejecting the "control" test as inappropriate,
grounded its decision squarely on the wife's "vested property right in
the community property, equal to that of her husband." The Robbins
case was distinguished on the ground that the California community
property law "gave the wife a mere expectancy," and that the husband
was in fact the owner.
For support of his "control theory" the commissioner also relied on
two additional cases--Corlis v. Bowers 41 and Lucas v. Earl.42 The
former had taxed to the settlor the income of a revocable trust, on the
theory well expressed in the following quotation from the opinion:
"The income that is subject to a man's unfettered command, and that
he is free to enjoy at his own option may be taxed to him as his income,
whether he sees fit to enjoy it or no~." 43 To the Poe Court, ownership
was the distinguishing factor between the Corliss and Poe cases, for it
declared: "While he has technically parted with title, yet he in fact
retains ownership, and all its incidents [ speaking of settlor in Corliss
case]. But here the husband never has ownership. That is in the community at the moment of acquisition [ referring to Poe case]." 44 In
the Lucas case a husband and wife had agreed that any property they
might acquire should be held by them as joint tenants. Relying on
this agreement they attempted to divide their joint income for federal
tax purposes, on the theory that the taxing statute seeks to tax income
only beneficially received and that the husband's income became the
joint property of both spouses the moment it was acquired. The Court,
however, refused to permit such division, stating: "There is no doubt
that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them" and that
this "was the import of the statute before us." 45 Ownership was again
considered the criterion of distinction by the Poe Court. "The very
40

282 U.S. 101 at 112, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
281 U.S. 376, 50 S. Ct. 336 (1930).
42
281 U.S. III, 50 s. Ct. 241 (1930).
43
Id. 376 at 378.
44
282 U.S. 101 at 116, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
45
281 U.S. III at 114, 115, 50 S. Ct. 241 (1930).
41
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assignment in that case [ referring to Lucas v. Earl] was bottomed
on the fact that the earnings would be the husband's property, else
there would have been nothing on which it could operate. That case
presents quite a different question from this, because here, by law, the
earnings were never the property of the husband, but that of the community." 48
•
While the Robbins, Corliss and Lucas cases do support the commissioner's argument in Poe v. Seaborn that "right to control" is a
proper test of taxability, the Court refused to apply the rule to the
husband's control over community property, for, as seen in the quotation from the case, the control of the husband was not for his benefit,
but for the benefit of the community.
Companion cases to Poe v. Seaborn extended its rule to the states
of Arizona,47 Louisiana,48 and Texas, 49 and it was thereafter extended
by ruling; of the Treasury Department 50 to Idaho, Nevada and New
Mexico.
B. California's History
The net result of the foregoing developments was that in all community property jurisdictions except California, community income
was divisible and taxable by halves upon the spouses' individual returns. California had been left by the way-side by reason of the fact
that its community property laws had been interpreted to give the
wife, during coverture, a mere expectancy 51-not a present, vested
right, as in other community property jurisdictions.
United States v. Robbins 52 was the case that foreclosedthe interests
of the ~alifornia spouses, and it is interesting as much· for what it said
as for its actual holding. A California husband who had been denied
the right to divide his income between himself and his wife, sued to
recover the amount by which his income tax had been increased by
reason of such denial. In affirming the denial, the Court placed its
decision OtJ- two grounds: ( r) that the wife, in Ca~ifornia, had no vested
interest in community property; and ( 2) that, irrespective of the char48

282 U.S. 101 at II7, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. u8, 51 S. Ct. 62 (1930).
48
Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 51 S. Ct. 64 (1930).
49
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122, 51 S. Ct. 62 (1930).
.
50
Miro. 3853, IO INT. REv. BuLL. 139 (1931), 313 CCH FED. TAX SERV.
1f 6032.
51
Spreckels v. Spreckels, I 16 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897); Estate of Moffitt,
153 Cal. 359, 95 P. 653 (1908); Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601, 218 P. ~2,
(1923).
52
269 U.S. 315, 46 S. Ct. 148 (1926~.
47
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acter of the wife's interest, the husband had such control over community property as to justify the imposition of the tax on him for the
whole. Concerning this latter point, the Court commented:
". • . Even if we are wrong as to the law of California, and
assume that the wife had an interest in the community income
that Congress could tax if it so minded, it does not follow that
Congress could not tax the husband for the whole. Although restricted in the matter of gifts, etc., he alone has the disposition of
the fund. He may spend it substantially as he chooses, and if he
wastes it in debauchery the wife has no redress ..•. That he may
be taxed for such a fund seems to us to need no ai:guments." 58
It was following this opinion that the Attorney General withdrew all
previous administrative rulings permitting division of income for tax
purposes between community property spouses.154
Only one course remained open to California after this decision
-that of legislative change. The legislature accepted the challenge,
and on July 29, 1927 the following curative amendment became effective:
"The respective interests of the husband and wife in community property during continuance of the marriage relation are
present, existing and equal interests under the management and
control of the husband...." 55
The income-tax effect of this amendment was interpreted in the case
of United States v. Malcolm,5° in a per curiam_ decision, as bringing
community income acquired after the effective date within the rule of
Poe v. Seaborn, permitting division of income between spouses and
taxation thereof by halves.
The effects of California's experiences are still felt today, and
practical problems arise in which it is necessary to distinguish between
income from "old type" community property ( that acquired prior to
July 29, 1927) and "new type" (acquired after July 29, 1927). The
bureau has ruled 57 that the Malcolm case is not applicable to income
58
Id. at 327. This was the language so vigorously relied upon by the commissioner in the subsequent case of Poe v. Seaborn, but which the Court refused to apply
to the facts of that case. To the effect that the control of the husband is not so broad
as indicated, see Harper v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 230, 464 CCH STAND. FED. TAX
REP. 1f 7283 (1946).
54
See discussion re note 36, supra.
55
Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) § 161a.
56
282 U.S. 792, 51 S. Ct. 184 (1931).
57
Mim. 3859, 10 INT. REv. BuLL. 140 (1931), 313 CCH FED. TAX SERV.
§ 6067; Also see CoLLINs, CoMMUNITY PROPERTY AND TAXES 23 (1945).

420
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from property acquired prior to July 29, 1927, nor to salaries, wages,
fees and other compensation earned prior to that date. Suppose H and
W, California spouses, acquired a farm as "old type" community
property. Is the current income from the farm taxable exclusively to
H, or is he entitled to allocate a portion of the income to services and
labor currently performed, thus establishing that portion as "new
type" to which the Malcolm case is applicable? Or, suppose H and W
own and operate an "old type" mercantile or industrial establishment.
Is the entire income attributable to a capital investment made prior to
the critical date and thus not subject to the "reportable by halves"
rule? It has been the practice in California to allocate such income in
part to the return on capital and in part to the current endeavor of the
spouses, the latter representing "new type" community income divisible
for income tax purposes.Gs

C. Oklahoma's History
The experiences of the state of Oklahoma with community property and federal taxes have not been entirely satisfactory, due altogether to the type of community property law first enacted by its
legislature.
On July 29, 1939 Oklahoma adopted a community property law
operative only if and when husband and wife elected to avail themselves of its provisions. Written notice of election by the spouses was
required.
Shortly after adoption of the law, an Oklahoma taxpayer and his
wife elected to bring themselves within the terms of its benefits and
did so by filing appropriate notices. Acting in conformity with the
Poe 'V. Seaborn doctrine, they thereafter filed separate income-tax
GS G.C.M. 1030, 6 INT. REV. BULL. 26 (1926), 462 CCH STAND. FED. TAX
REP. ,r 455.099; G.C.M. 9825, INT. REV. BULL. X-2-146, 462 CCH STAND. FED.
TAX REP. 1f 455.091; Scott, "California Farm Income and Community Property
Income Tax Returns," 21 TAXES 145 (1943); Oliver v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 684
(1945). See 454 CCH STAND. FED. TAX SERV. 1f 8376 as to the formula of allocation. This same problem exists in other community property jurisdictions, with respect
to income which is partially attributable to a capital investment of separate property
and partially allocable to compensation for personal services performed after marriage.
In a case arising from the state of Washington involving this problem, the Tax Court
held that resort to the formula established by G.C.M. 9825 (supra) was unnecessary
where taxpayer-husband and his partner (not his wife) had previously agreed upon
the amounts to be allowed themselves as compensation and the portion of profits to be
allocated as a return on invested capital. Tinling v. Commr., 7 T.C. 826, 474 CCH
STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1f 7225 (1946). In accord, Van Vorst v. Commr., 7 T.C.,
No. 96, 474 CCH STAND. FED. TAX SERV. REP. 1f7022 (1946).
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returns in which they each reported one-half of their income that
accrued subsequent to the election, and paid the resulting tax. The
commissioner, however, determined a deficiency, asserting that the
husband was taxable on all the income derived from his earnings. Both
the Tax Court and the circuit court of appeals sustained the husband,
relying on Poe v. Seaborn, concluding that once an election had been
filed, the wife became vested with one-half of all the community income, just the same as she does in other community property jurisdictions. But in the ensuing appeal to the Supreme Court, the opinions
of the lower courts were reversed. The Supreme Court held 59 that
the husband and wife were not entitled to divide their community
income between them for the purpose of the federal income tax. The
commissioner had relied heavily on the case of Lucas v. Earl, 60 contending that the situation resulting from the creation of community
property by the voluntary act of the parties was indistinguishable from
that existing in the Lucas case where husband an~ wife had created a
joint tenancy by voluntary act. In adopting this argument in toto the
Court said:
"Under Lucas v. Earl an assignment of income to be earned
or to accrue in the future, even though authorized by state law and
irrevocable in character; is ineffective to render the income immune from taxation as that of the assignor. On the other hand, in
those states which, by inheritance of the Spanish law, have always
had a legal community property system, which vests in each spouse
one-half of the community income as it accrues, each is entitled to
return one-half of the income as the basis of federal income tax.
Communities are of two sorts-consensual and legal. A consensual
community arises out of contract. It does not significantly differ in
origin or nature from such a status as was in question in Lucas v.
Earl, where by contract future income of the spouses was to vest
in them as joint tenants. In Poe v. Seaborn, supra, the court was
not dealing with a consensual community but one made an incident of marriage by the inveterate policy of the State. In that
case the court was faced with these facts: The legal community
system of the States in question long antedated the Sixteenth
Amendment and the first Revenue Act adopted thereunder. Under
that system, as a result of State policy, and without any act on.the
part of either spouse, one-half of the community income vested in
each spouse as the income accrued, and was, in law, to that extent,
the income of the spouse." 61
Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944).
281 U.S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 241 (1930).
111
323 U.S. 44 at 46, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944).

isg
110

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

422

[ Vol. 45

- Justice Douglas wrote a vigorous dissent, referred to earlier in
this paper,62 in which he criticized the Poe v. Seaborn doctrine as representing a "competing theory of income tax liability" with that of
Lucas v. Earl.
Thus, after the Harmon case, Oklahoma was in a position similar
to California's position after the Robbins case,63 and it took a similar,
though more drastic, way out. It completely repealed its elective community property law, substituting a new law without elective features,
effective July 26, r945. 64 The Bureau of Internal Revenue has since
ruled that under this law it is the privilege of Oklahoma spouses to
include in their separate federal income tax returns only one-half of
their community income r_eceived or accrued on and after the effective
date of the a<;t. 65
D. Oregon
For a short period of time Oregon had an elective community
property law virtuaily identical with that first enacted by the state
of Oklahoma. It adopted the law in r943 66 but, as it was assumed to
be ineffective for federal income tax purposes under the Harmon
decision, the law was ·repealed by legislative act effective June r6,
1945.67 Thus, Oregon is now without the ranks of the community
property jurisdictions.

E. Territory of Hawaii
, The territory of Hawaii has recently joined the fold, by the enactment of community property laws, effective June r, r945. 68 This law
contains none of the elective features of the former Oklahoma law, and
by a recent ruling "the Bureau recognizes that the Hawaiian statute
in question satisfies the requirements of a community property system,
as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Poe v. Seaborn (282 U.S., ror ... ) and Commissioner v. Harmon (323 U.S.,
44 .•• ) so as to permit a husband and wife, domiciled in Hawaii, to
include in their separate Federal income tax returns one-half of their
community income:" 69
'
62
63

Supra, note

12.

269 U.S. 315, 46 S. Ct. 148 (1926).
M Okla. Laws (1945) tit. 32.
65
J.T. 3782, INT. REV. BULL. 1946-4-12237 (p. 6), 464 CCH STAND. FED.
TAX REP.1f 6131.
'
60
Ore. Laws (1943) c. 440 (effective June 9, 1943).
67
Ore. Laws (1945) c. 270.
68
Hawaii Laws ( 1945) Series D-20 l : Act 273.
69
LT. 3784, INT. REv. BuLL. 1946-4-12239 (p. 7 at 8), 464 CCH STAND.
FED •. TAX REP. 1f 6133; as to treatment for federal income tax purposes of various
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F. Summary and Comments
I. By way of summary, it is to be noted that in all community
property jurisdictions today, community income is divisible and taxable
to the spouses by halves. Further, where income is the product of
separate capital ( or "old type" California community property) and of
current effort of either or both spouses, it must be apportioned between
capital investment and personal service.
2. Is the rule permitting division of community property for income tax purposes applicable to income from property that was originally separate property, but which, by agreement of the spouses, has
been converted to community property? In several of the community
property jurisdictions it is possible for the spouses, by agreement, to
convert their separate property into community property. 70 Suppose
they do. Is the income subsequently accruing subject to the rule permitting its division and separate return by the spouses? The cases seem
to so indicate, and the Treasury Department has so ruled.11 Such a
result, while consistent with the rationale of Poe 'V. Seaborn, is a patent
illustration of the "competing theories of income tax liability" illustrated by Lucas 'V. Earl on the one hand and Poe 'V. Seaborn on the
other, referred to by Justice Douglas.in his dissent in Commissioner 'V.
Harmon.
The converse of the rule is, of course, also true. Spouses lose the
right to divide and report income by halves as to any income from
property which by agreement they have converted from community
property into separate property. 12
3. -A problem upon which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
reached apparently conflicting results is that concerning the tax status
of income accruing during the administration of the estate of a de-

types of income under the Hawaiian Act, see LT. 3792, INT. REv. BuLL, 1946-812289 (p. 5), 464 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1f 6180.
70
3 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 19.20 et seq. (1942);
I DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF CoMMUNITY PROPERTY, § 144 (1943).
71
Black v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 9th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 355; Shoenhair v.
Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 576 at 579 (1941); Harmon v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 40
(1942); G.C.M. 19248, INT. REv. BuLL. XVI-46-9036 (p. 2), 373 CCH FED.
TAX SERV. 1f 6675. May California spouses by agreement convert "old type" community property into "new type," the income from which would be taxable by halves?
In United States v. Pierotti, (C.C.A. 9th:, 1946) 154 F. (2d) 758, and in United
States v. Goodyear, (C.C.A. 9th, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 523, such an agreement was held
effective for. federal estate tax purposes. It would seem to be similarly effective for
income tax purposes.
72
Sparkman v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 9th, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 774; HelveriT-lg v. Hickman, (C.C.A. 9th, 1934) 70 F. (2d) 985.
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ceased spouse in a community property jurisdiction. The problem :first
reached the court in the case of Commissioner v. Larson,78 inyolving
the community property laws of the State of Washington. Larson,
domiciled in Washington, died leaving his widow and an estate consisting entirely of community property. Under the laws of Washington,
the entire community estate, and not merely the half interest of the
decedent, is subject to administration; and in this case all of the community property was accordingly brought into the estate for administration purposes. The executor thereafter reported the entire income
from the estate for income tax purposes, and the surviving widow
included no part of the income items in her return. The commissioner
subsequently levied a deficiency against the widow, asserting that inasmuch as she "owned" a present, vested interest in one-half of the
community property--even though it was subject to administration for
the purpose of applying it to the payment of community debts-she
should be taxable upon such half. The court acknowledged, as stated
in Poe v. Seaborn,74 that "ownership" was the proper test of taxability,
but explained that in the State of Washington, "the 'ownership' of the
income of Community property during administration and liquidation
thereof, is in the executor or administrator, and that therefore he should
report such income in the income tax return of the estate." 75
A contra· result was reached, under the laws of the State of California, in Bishop v. Commissioner. 76 The facts were very nearly identical with those of the Larson case. A California husband died leaving
his widow surcviving. His estate consisted of community property
(acquired by the spouses after July 29, 1927). A California statute
likewise required that all community property be subject to administration in the estate of the deceased spouse. The surviving widow returned
one-half of the estate income in her individual income tax return on the
theory that she owned a half. The commissioner, relying on the Lar- . '
son case, assessed a deficiency, asserting that the estate was chargeable
for the entire income. He was sustained in this position by the Tax
Court. The circuit court, however, reversed, stating:
"The Tax Court appears to have assumed that, upon decedent's death, petitioner's half of the community property· ceased
73

(C.C.A. 9th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 85.
282 U.S. IOI, 51 s. Ct. 58 (1930).
76 131 F. (2d) 85 at 87. For a criticism of this result, on the grounds that it
does not accord with traditional community property concepts, see I DE FUNIAK,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, § 205 at pp. 585-587 (1943).
76
(C.C.A. 9th, 1945) 152 F. (2d) 389, 46-1 USTC § 9107.
74
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to be hers and became part of the decedent's estate. The assumption is incorrect. Petitioner's half, like decedent's half, was subject to administration, but, unlike his half, her half never became
part of his estate. . . .
.
"The Larson case involved community property in the State
of Washington. This Court held that, by the law of that State,
the 'ownership' of income derived from such property, including
that derived from the wife's half, after the husband's death and
during administration of his estate is 'in the executor or administrator.' There is no such law with respect to the community property acquired in California after July 29, r 92 7 ." 77
It would seem that the reasoning of the Bishop case is in line with
basic concepts of community property ownership by husband and wife,
whereas the Larson case appears to represent an unwarranted departure
from both previously and subsequently decided cases interpreting the
wife's interest in community property.
4. An interesting case, making a logical application of the "vested
interest" theory of the wife in community property, was decided by the
Tax Court on February 20, 1946.18 This case is illustrative of the fact
that the husband's managerial powers over community property are
not tantamount to ownership. 79 The taxpayers, husband and wife, were
domiciled in California, and they filed income tax returns on a community property income tax basis. The commissioner declared a deficiency in the income of each, as a result of a determination to the effect
that the income of two trusts created by the husband was taxable to
the taxpayers as community income. The trusts had been created by
the husband for the benefit of the minor children of the taxpayers, the
trust res consisting of community assets. His wife had not given formal
consent to the creation of the trusts, although she had orally assented
to and acquiesced in their creation. The trusts were purportedly irrevocable. The commissioner took the position that the income from the
trusts was taxable to the husband and wife under section 166 of the
Internal' Revenue Code [ also under sections 22 (a) and r 67], since
the trusts were revocable by the wife, a person who did not have a
77

Id. at 391.
Harper v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 230, 464 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP.
1f 7283
(1946).
79
Several authors, attempting to justify taxation of the husband for all community
income, have given as a reason, the fact that his broad managerial powers are tantamount
to ownership. For example see I PAuL, FEDERAL EsTATE AND G1FT TAXATION, § 1.09
at p. 61 (1942); 3 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 19.01, p. 6
(1942).
78
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substantial adverse interest in the corpus or income of the trust. Under
the California Code a husband cannot make a gift of community personalty without his wife's written consent, and any gift without such
consent is voidable at her option. The Tax Court held that the wife had
the right to revoke the trusts and to reinstate as part of the community
property the gifts held in trust; and further, that the commissioner
was correct in determining that the income from the trusts was taxable
to the husband and wife as community income under section I 66 of
the· code. The court found it unnecessary to determine taxability under
code sections 22(a) and 167.
·

G. Constitutionality of Legislative Proposals to Change the Rule
A number of articles have been written concerning the constitutionality of proposals aimed at the abolition of the right of spouses to
divide their community income and pay taxes thereon by halves upon
separate returns. 80 Their very number suggests .that there is at least
an apparent hurdle to overcome, and such a hurdle is found in the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Ho~per ,v. Wisconsin.Si. There the Court had before it a statute of
Wisconsin which provided that in computing the amount of state income taxes payable by p~rsons residing together as members of a
family, the income of the wife should be added to that of her husband
and assessed to and payable by him. It w~s held that, since in law and
in fact the wife's income was her separate property, the state was
without power to measure the husband's tax in part by the income of
his wife. "We have no doubt" the court said, "that, because of the
fundamental conceptions which underlie our system, any attempt by a
state to measure the tax on one person's property or income by reference to the property or income of 'another is contrary to due process
of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That which is
not in fact the taxpayer's income cannot be made such by calling it
income." 82
80

For illustrative comments see: Altman, "Community Property and Joint Return," 19 TAXES 588 (1941); Altman, "Community Property in Peril," id. 262;
Community Property Laws as Determinable in Federal Income Taxation, 40 ILL. L.
REV. 136 (1945); Latcham, "Invasion of the Community Income Tax Privileges,"
20 WAsH. L. REv. 44. (1945); Magill, "The Federal Income Tax on the Family,"
20 TEXAS L. REV. 150 (1941); 3 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 19.61 (1942); Oliver, "Community Property and the Taxation of Family Income,"
20 TEXAS L. REV. 532 (1942); Ray, "Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation of
Community Property: Income Tax," 30 CAL. L. REv. 397 (1942).
Sl. 284 U.S. 206, 52 s. Ct. 120 (1931).
8
2ld. at 215.,
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This language stands directly in the way of proponents of attempts
to tax community income to the earner or to the spouse having its
management and control, for the decisions are legion to the effect that
the non-earning spouse actually "owns" one half of all community
property, from the very moment of its inception. A proposal to require compulsory joint returns by spouses, with a tax determination
measured by their combined aggregate income, may not constitute a
tax on the husband measured by his wife's income; still, that element
is involved, and the applicable rate is certainly influenced by the fact
that income other than the husband's has been given consideration. So,
opponents to the proposals contend, even this form is unconstitutional
under the Hoeper decision.
There is much to be said on behalf of the proponents' position,
however. If the interest of the non-earning spouse had been created by
voluntary transfer of the husband, clearly the entire income would
have been taxable to the husband. 88 Should the tax incidents be different merely because the shift occurs, not by voluntary act of the husband,
but by reason of the operation of the law? To so state certainly makes
the incidents of taxation turn "upon elusive and subtle casuistries" 84
and ignores economic realities. Further, taxation is concerned more
with the practical application of facts as they exist than with legal
subtleties. 85 It is a fact that the husband does have broad managerial
control over community income. Should not this fact, this power of
management and control, be sufficient justification for imposing on him
a tax on its whole? Illustrations are not lacking in related fields where
the Supreme Court has thought that the element of control has been an
operative fact, or where one person's tax has been measured in part by
another's income. For example: the element of control was held sufficient in United States v. Robbins; 88 a donor has been taxed on income
received from renewal contracts which he had previously assigned to
his wife; 87 a donee's tax has been measured by the donor's cost basis; 88
and a donor's tax has been measured by income from a bond coupon
previously given to a donee. 89 Perhaps one of the most significant
88

Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 336 (1930).
Frankfurter in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. I06 at I 18, 60 S. Ct.
444 (1940).
85
Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 50 S. Ct. 336 (1930); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 53 S .Ct. 369 (1933).
88
269 U.S. 315, 46 S. Ct. 148 (1926).
87
Helvering v. Eubank, 3n U.S. 122, 61 S. Ct. 149 (1940).
88
Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 49 S. Ct. 199 (1929).
69
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144 (1940).
84 Justice

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 45
'

cases in this field is that of H elvering v. Clifford/ 0 in which a settlor
was taxed on income of a five-year irrevocable family trust. The fact
that the settlor had retained wide powers of control over the trust res
definitely influenced the court. An interesting comparison of the powers
of control over the trust res retained by the settlor in the Clifford case
with those of the husband over the community property in Poe v. Seaborn has been made by Altman, who concludes:
"Not a single power-not even one-was reserved by the husband as grantor or trustee in the Clifford case which the husband
in the Seaborn case did not have as manager of the community
property." 91
That certatn elements of control are alone sufficient to justify taxing a
settlor on income from a trust, regardless of its duration, is the position
of the Treasury Department in its recent decision interpreting the
Clifford case,92
Undoubtedly the "climate of judicial opinion" 93 has changed in
recent times; and it is entirely possible that under the doctrines of these
more recent cases cited, and others of similar import, the Court could
find constitutional justification for legislation that eradicates a doctrine
which rests differences in tax treatment of husbands and wives on
nothing more than the contingency of their domicile under either a
ganancial or a common law system of marital ownership. An oft-quoted
phrase of Justice Holmes has pointed the way:"... Taxation is not so
much concerned with the refinements -of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed-the actual benefit .for which the tax
is paid." 94

III
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX LAWS TO
COMMUNITY PROPERTY

A. Statutory Amendments
As previously indicated,95 prior to the adoption of the Revenue
Act of I 942, the application of community property concepts to federal
90

309 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940).
Altman, "Community Property in Peril," 19 TAXES 262 at 265 (1941).
92
See T. D. 5488, INT. REV, BuLL. 1946-2-12210, 461 CCH STAND. FED.

91

1f 86A.
1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, § 1.09 at p. 62 (1942).
94
Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 at 378, 50 S. Ct. 336 (1930).
95 See discussion pertaining to note 18, supra. On February 26, 1921, United

TAX REP.
93

States Attorney General Palmer ruled that in the states of Washington, Arizona, Idaho,
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estate taxes resulted in the rule that only one-half of community
property was includible in the estate of a deceased spouse, the remainder being exempt due to the fact that it belonged to the surviving
spouse and had never been the property of the deceased.
Unlike experiences in the income tax field, however, efforts to
change the rule as to the estate tax ( and gift tax also) culminated in
success with the passage of the Revenue Act of I 942. The act amended
the Internal Revenue Code, with respect to community interests and
estate taxes, in three particulars. The first, relating to revocable transfers, is found in section 8 I I ( d) ( 5), of the code which reads as follows:
"For the purposes of this subsection and subsection ( c), a
transfer of property held as community property by the decedent
and surviving spouse under the law of any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States, or any foreign country, shall be
considered to have been made by the decedent, except such part
thereof as may be shown to have been received as compensation
for personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse or
derived originally from such compensation or from separate property of the surviving spouse."
The second amendment-Internal Revenue Code, section 8 I I ( e) ( 2)
-relates to the inclusion in the estate of the deceased spouse of community property, and provides that the estate value shall be determined
by including the value at the time of decease of all property:
"To the extent of the interest therein held as community
property by the decedent and surviving spouse under the law of
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or any
foreign country, except such part thereof as may be shown to have
been received as compepsation for personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse or derived originally from such
compensation or. from separate property of the surviving spouse.
In no case shall such interest included in the gross estate of the
decedent be less than the value of such part of the community
property as was subject to the decedent's power of testamentary
disposition."
The third amendment to the estate tax concerns the proceeds of life
insurance. It is found at section 8 II (g) ( 4) of the Code, and reads
thus:
"For the purposes of this subsection, premiums or other conNew Mexico, Louisiana and Nevada, there should be included in the gross estate of a
deceased spouse, one-half only of community property. 32 Op. Atty. Gen. 435.
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sideration paid with property held as community property by the
insured and surviving spouse under the law of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or any foreign country,
shall be considered to have been paid by the insured, except suc4
part thereof as may be shown to have been received as compensation for personal services actually rendered by the surviving
spouse or derived originally from such compensation or from
separate property of the surviving spouse; and the term 'incidents
of ownership' includes incidents of ownership possessed by the decedent at his death as manager ofthe community."

+

B. Constitutionality
As might be expected the constitutionality of these amendments
was promptly challenged, and two cases involving the question reached
the Supreme Court of the United States. Opinions upholding their
constitutionality were handed down December IO, I945-96 As both
cases had arisen on appeal by the government from decisions declaring
the amendments unconstitutional, the final outcome was awaited with
much anticipation.
Wiener Case. In the Wiener case, the commissioner, proc;eding
under section 8 I I ( e) ( 2) of the code, had levied an estate tax on the
termination of the marital community by the death, after the effective
date of the I 942 act, of a husband domiciled in Louisiana, the tax
being measured by the value of the entire community property. Also,
acting under section 8 II (g) ( 4), he had included in decedent's gross
estate the entire proceeds of insurance policies on decedent's life.
Children of the deceased, his sole heirs, brought suit in the district
court against the collector'to recover, as an overpayment, so much of
the tax as was attributable to the inclusion in decedent's gross estate of
his wife's share of the community property, and of all, rather than
half, of the insurance proceeds.
The facts indicated that decedent had married his wife in Louisiana
and lived with her in that state until his death, his wife surviving.
During the marriage he carried on various kinds of business, and with
the exception of certain Massachusetts real estate ( not in dispute) ail
the property held by decedent at his death was community property.
At no time during the marriage was the wife employed, nor was any
part of the community, property derived originally from any separate
property of her own.
96

Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 66 S. Ct. 178 (i945); United States v.
Rompel, 326 U.S. 367, 66 S. Ct. 191, CCH INHERITANCE, EsTATE AND G1Fr TAX
SE~v., FED,, 7th ~d., 1f I0,240 (1945).
·
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Included in the community property were the proceeds of fifteen
insurance policies all of which had been taken out during the marriage,
which named the wife as beneficiary and reserved to the insured the
right to change the beneficiary.
Plaintiffs had returned an estate tax based on the value of one-half
of decedent's community property, plus one-half of the insurance proceeds. The commissioner assessed a deficiency based on the failure to
include in the gross estate the entire value of all community property
and the entire proceeds of the insurance policies. The tax was paid,
claim for refund filed, and upon its rejection, this suit was begun.
Plaintiffs J1'1.ade a number of specific contentions of unconstitutionality, all based on the familiar concept of the wife's vested one-half
interest in community property, arguing from this that the taxing
amendments were a denial of due process because the death of neither
spouse operated to transfer, relinquish or enlarge any legal or economic
interest in the property of the other spouse.
The Court did not view the situation in this light, however. As
in previous cases its approach involved an analysis of the incidents of
ownership released upon the d~ath of the spouse, not of those which
the survivor may have had in the property prior to the death. This is
evident from the following language of the opinion:
" ••. As we have seen, the death of the husband of the Louisiana marital community not only operates to transfer his rights in
his share of the community to his heirs or those taking under his
will. It terminates his expansive and sometimes profitable control
over the wife's share, and for the first time brings her half of the
property into her full and exclusive possession, control and enjoyment. The cessation of these extensive powers of the husband,
even though they were powers over property which he never
'owned,' and the establishment in the wife of new powers of control over her share, though it was always hers, furnished appropriate occasions for the imposition of an excise tax....
". . . Since the levy is an excise and not a property tax, the
case is not one of taking the survivor's property to pay the tax on
decedent's estate. As the tax is upon the surrender of old incidents
of property by the decedent and the acquisition of new by the
survivor, it is appropriately measured by the value of the property
to which these incident$ attach." 97
97
326 U.S. 340 at 355-356, 358, 66 S. Ct. 178 (1945). This decision has
not escaped criticism. For example: "Every so often a case such as the Wiener Case in
the United States Supreme Court focuses public attention upon the field of community
property law. Perhaps to the average layman, politician, and tax specialist, community
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Rompel Case. Th~ Rompel cas~ was decided upon the authority of
the Wiener decision, and on the identical theory. The facts were quite
similar. A husband and wife in Texas had accumulated community
property through the operation of a livestock ranch on which they
lived and from which sprang, either directly or indirectly, all their
earnings. Neither spouse had ever been ·employed for wages. The
husband died, and the problem arose as to what portion of the community estate should be included in his gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes, the amendments previously quoted being in effect. The
Court said:
"On the death of the husband, in Texas, as in Louisiana, the
wife's share of the community is freed from the restrictions of his
exclusive management and control, and the wife acquires exclusive
possession and enjoyment of the property constituting her share,
as well as important new powers of control and disposition over

it. ~ . .

-

,

"The death of either the husband or the wife of a Texas community thus effects sufficient alteration of the spouses' possession
and enjoyment and reciprocal powers of control and disposition
of the community property as to warrant the imposition of an
excise tax measured by the value of the entire community." 98

C. Hypothetical Cases
The constitutionality of these amendments thus having been finally
established, some comment as to. the manner of their operation seems
appropriate.
r. Where the community property consists solely of earnings of
one spouse, who predeceases the non-earner, the tax incidence appears
to be the same in a community as in a non-community property state.
The entire value of the community property is includible in the gross
estate of the deceased earning spouse under section 8 r r ( e) ( 2) of the
code. Had the spouses been residents of a non-community state-for
instance, Illinois-the result would have been identical. Here, then,
the amendment seems to have achieved its purpose, viz., the eliminaproperty is a subject that only achieves interest or importance through the momentary
glare of the federal tax spotlight. And even that consideration of community property
is liable to be a highly distorted one, if viewed in the light of the Supreme Court's
decision in the Wiener Case. This decision, in fact, displays such an astounding lack
of knowledge and understanding of community property as to convict the justices of
either lack of capability or intellectual dishonesty." de Funiak, "Community Property
and Law Schools," 20 CAL. ST. B. J. 398 (1945).
98
United States v. Rompel, 326 U.S. 367, 66 S. Ct. 191 (1945).
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tion of the advantage formerly held by residents of community property jurisdictions.
2. But suppose the non-earning spouse predeceases the earner.
What happens then to the advantage formerly accorded the community property residents? The amendment seems not only to have
removed it from the community property residents, but to have transferred it to those of non-community property jurisdictions. Note the
last sentence of section 8 I I ( e) ( 2) which requires the inclusion in the
estate of any deceased spouse of at least that portion of the community
estate over which he or she had the power of testamentary disposition.
In all community property jurisdictions except two, each spouse has the
right to dispose by will of his or her share of community property,9°
that share being one-half thereof.
Suppose that H and W, residents of a community property state in
which they each have power of testamentary disposition, have accumulated community property, all traceable to wages paid for personal
services of H. W dies, leaving H surviving. Under section 8I_I(e)(2),
one-half of their community property must be included in her gross
estate, since she had power to dispose of this share by will. Had H
and W been residents of a non-community property state the result
would have been different, however. Nothing would have been taxable in W's estate, since she would have had no power of testamentary
disposition over the survivor's earnings; further, she did not own any
property at death.100
Another result of a more extreme nature may possibly arise under
the amendment. Suppose the existence of the same facts as those stated
in the last example, except that the community property owned by the
spouses on W's death was traceable, not to "wages" paid for personal
services of H, but to "profits" of a community property farm which
he operated. In such case may not it be plausibly argued that the income which H received was not "compensation for personal services"
but was, rather, "earnings" from farming operations? If so, the "en99 I DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, § 198 (1943). (In
Idaho and Louisiana the power of testamentary disposition of the wife is somewhat
limited in the amount that can be left to others than lineal heirs. In Nevada and
New Mexico the wife has no right of testamentary disposition, except in cases of
separation. In other community property jurisdictions the wife's power to dispose
of her share of the community property by will is absolute, as is her husband's.)
10° Freeman and Mueller, "Federal Taxation of Community Property," 34 CAL.
L. REV. 398 at 407 (1946); Friedland, "Community Estates-Problems Raised by
the Decision in Wiener and Herbst," 24 TAXES 194 (1946); Winstead, "Aftermath
of Herbst and Wiener Decisions," 24 TEXAS L. REV. 439 (1946).
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tire" community property owned by H and W on the latter's death
would be includible in her estate, rather than merely one-half, as in
the previous example: This interpretation-that "compensation for
personal services" means only "wages" received for such servicesseems unduly restrictive in view of the reports of the House and Senate Committees .that considered section 8 II ( e) ( 2) prior to its enactment. They each reported that "the amendments make due provision
for the exclusion from the gross estate of that portion of the community
property which is economically attributable to the survivor." But, the
words "economically attributable" do not appear in the amendments.
Rather, a different legislative standard was set up, and whether or not
there will be accorded to it the same meaning as that reported by the
committees awaits a further ruling of the bureau and possibly a decision of the courts.
,
Thus, it seems that in attempting to remove an advantage formerly
held, another has been created. Concerning this discrimination, one
writer has recommended: "lq. order to effect the purpose of the amendments which was to equalize taxation in community and non-community states, it is submitted that a further amendment to 8 I 2 ( c) should
be made so that the estate of the surviving earner is permitted a deduction for the value of the community property taxed in the estate of
a prior decedent when that property has gone to the survivor. This
deduction should be applicable irrespective of the length of time
elapsing between the deaths of the two spouses." 101
3. Insurance proceeds. Section 8II(g)(2), dealing with the taxability of proceeds of life insurance receivable by beneficiaries other
than the estate of the insured, defines two situations in which such
proceeds are includible in the gross estate of the insured. If the insured
either (a) paid the premiums, or (b) possessed at his death incidents
of ownership, the proceeds are includible in his estate even though
pursuant to the policy the proceeds are payable to third persons.
Section 8 II (g) ( 4) relates these two provisions to estates containing community property in the following manner: (a) it provides that
premiums paid with community property of the insured and surviving
spouse "shall be considered to have been paid" by the insured, unless
the surviving spouse shows that the payments were made from funds
101 Professor McAllister's comment, "The Estate and Gift Tax Amendments,
Revenue Act-of 1942," 31 CAL. L. REv. 60 at 71 (1942). (For a suggestion that this
tax may be avoided by inter vivos transfer of wife's interest to her husband, even in
contemplation of death, see discussion infra, relating to note l 14.)
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received by the survivor as compensation for personal services rendered
or from separate property of the survivor; (b) it defines the term
"incidents of ownership" to include those incidents owned by deceased
at his death as manager of the community.
Under the first part of section 8I I (g) ( 4) it is apparent that proceeds of insurance policies on the life of the earning spouse, paid for
with community funds, must be included in this estate, no matter who
the beneficiary is, unless paid with funds economically attributable to
the surviving spouse. A similar result would follow on the same facts
if the spouses were residents of a non-community property jurisdiction,
for where the premiums are paid by the deceased, the proceeds are
includible in his estate.
The "incidents of ownership" test, however, indicates that a different result might follow in a community property jurisdiction than
would occur in a non-community property state. Suppose H and W
are residents of the State of Washington, a community property jurisdiction. A life insurance policy is written on H's life, naming W as
beneficiary. W pays all premiums from community salary which she
has earned, and H assigns all interest iri the policy to her, so that he
has none of the normal incidents of ownership, i.e., he cannot change
the beneficiary, he cannot borrow on the policy, nor assign it as collateral. H dies. Are the proceeds includible in his estate for estate tax
purposes? The "payment of premiums" test does not require such result because the premiums were paid with funds "received as compensation for personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse."
And H had none of the normal incidents of ownership as that term is
used in section 8 I I (g) ( 2) (B). But he did have the management and
control of community personalty at his death under the laws of the
State of Washington. Does this management and control constitute "incidents of ownership" sufficient to require the inclusion of the proceeds
in his estate, as that term is defined in section 8I I (g) ( 4)? Not only
do the words of the statute so indicate, but also the Regulations 102 lend
support to that conclusion. But if exactly the same set of facts existed
with reference to a husband and wife who were residents of a nonTREAS. REG. 105, § 81.27 (1942). "Insurance receivable by other beneficiaries•••• (a) ••• in case of decedent dying after October 21, 1942•••• For the
purposes of this section, the term 'incidents of ownership' is not confined to ownership
in the technical legal sense•• '.. [It] includes incidents of ownership possessed by the
deceased as manager of the community where the insurance policy is property held as
community property by the decedent and spouse.••."
102
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community property state, it is believed that an opposite result would
be reached: the proceeds would not be includible in deceased's estate
because (a) he did not pay the premiums, and (b) he did not possess
any "incidents of ownership."
Thus again, it seems that the community property amendments to
the code have gone beyond their suppos,ed goal of eliminating the previously existing preferential position of the community property states,
and have created another inequity equally unjustifiable. This problem
was not before the Court in the Wiener decision,103 and was not commented on, although there were fifteen insurance policies on the life
of the deceased husband, payable to the wife as beneficiary. However,
the insured possessed the right to change the beneficiary of these policies, and that this was the ground relied upon by the Court is implicit
in the following quotation from its opinion:
"But it is sufficient for present purposes that the tax is laid
upon the amount receivable by the wife as a beneficiary of the
policies on the death of her husband, and that the husband possessed at his death an incident of ownership, the power to change
the beneficiaries." 104

D. Resume of Estate Tax Developments
I. Prior to the Revenue Act of r 942, the application of community
property principles to federal estate taxes resulted in savings to owners
of community property, for on the death of one o( the spouses, only
one-half of the community property was includible in the gross estate
of the deceased.
2. The Revenue Act of r 942 changed this by requiring the inclusion in the estate of the deceased spouse of the full value of all
community property, except that portion of it that is economically
attributable to the survivor. However, regardless of this exception,
there must be included as a minimum, the value of that portion which
is subject to the testamentary disposition of the deceased, which share,
we have seen, is one-half of the community property in all jurisdictions
except Nevada and New Mexico.
3. In certain situations, the amendments appear not only to remove
the advantage formerly held by residents of community property jurisdictions, but actually to place them at a distinct disadvantage.
108

326 U.S. 340, 66 S. Ct. 178, CCH INHERITANCE, EsTATE AND GIFT TAX
7th ed., 1f 10,239 (1945). Case reviewed supra, commencing page 430.
lM Id. at 363.
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IV
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL GIFT TAX LAWS
TO COMMUNITY PROPERTY

A. Statutory Amendment
Prior to January 1, 1943, community property concepts affected
federal gift tax laws in precisely the same manner as they did federal
income and estate taxes. Gifts of community property were considered
to be half from the husband and half from the wife.105 Thus, community spouses were given a distinct advantage over spouses resident in
non-community property states, since they were able to take advantage
of the tax rates in the lower brackets.
However, as previously noted,106 the Revenue Act of 1942 contained a provision amending the federal gift tax law and purporting to
eliminate this preferential treatment.
By section rnoo( a) of the code, a tax is imposed "upon the transfer
during such calendar year by any individual . . . of property by
gift...." This is the basic gift tax provision. Its applicability to gifts
of community property is determined by the 1942 Revenue Act amendment, found at section rnoo(d) of the code, which provides:
"All gifts of property held as community property under the
law of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or
any foreign country shall be considered to be the gifts of the husband except that gifts of such property as may be shown to have
been received as compensation for personal services actually rendered by the wife or derived originally from such compensation or
from separate property of the wife shall be considered to be gifts
of the wife."
The amendment was made applicable only to gifts made in 1943 and
succeeding calendar years.101
B. Constitutionality

No case has been found in which the constitutionality of this amendment has been challenged. It is a part of the same act that was sustained by the Court in the Wiener and Rompel decisions, however, and
the motivating purpose behind it was the same as that involved in the
105
Letter of Deputy Commissioner D. S. Bliss, dated November 22, 1935, CCH
INHERITANCE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SERV., FED., 7th ed., § 3935.175.
106
Supra, note l 6, discussion re.
107
Revenue Act of 1942, § 455, 56 Stat. L. 953.
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amendments there under consideration.. The objections.to taxing the
husband for the value of community property which has been transferred by gift ( other than such as is economically attributable to the
wife) do not seem any greater than those advanced to taxing the husband's estate for the full value of community property owned by the
spouses at his death.108 ,
C. Hypothetical Cases
Taxability of gifts by husband which are voidable by wife. In
the states of California and Washington, a husband has no power to
make a gift of community property without the consent of the wife.109
The wife has the power. to reclaim to the community any such gifts
made without her consent. It was recognition of this fact that recently
led the Tax Court to hold that income from community property given
by the husband to a trustee in trust for his children was properly taxable to the husband and wife as community income.110 Suppose a husband in California or Washington makes a gift of community personalty in trust for the benefit of his son. His wife fails to join in the gift.
Is it taxable as a gift under section IQOO(d)? In the Sanford case 111
the Court had before it a problem sin;iilar in principle, although it was
sufficiently different on its facts to preclude its citation as controlling
authority. The facts were these. In 1913, before the enactment of the
first gift tax statute, which was· enacted in 1924, decedent created a
trust for the benefit of named beneficiaries, reserving the power to
terminate the µ-ust, or to modify it. In 1.919 he surrendered the power
to revoke, but reserved the power to modify. In 1924, after the effective date of the gift tax statute, he relinquished his remaining power
to modify the trust. It was contended by the commissioner that the
gift did not become complete until the donoi:;'s final relinquishment in
1924 of the power to modify, and that, as this occurred after th!;! passage of the gift tax law, a taxable gift was at that time consummated.
The contrary contention upon behalf of the donor's estate was that the
gift was complete upon the relinquishment of the donor's power to
revoke the trust, which since it occurred before the passage of the gift
tax law, resulted in no· tax liability. In affirming the position taken by
the commissioner, the Court gave two reasons: ( 1) that under the
statute there was no intent to tax gifts before the donor had fully parted
I.

108

.

'

Winstead, "Aftermath of Herbst and \Viener Decisions," 24 TEXAS L. REv.

439 at 444 (1946).

·

109 I DE FUNIAK, PRIN,CIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY,
110

§ 122 (1943).

Supra, note 78.
111
Sanford Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939).
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with his interest in the donated property; and ( 2) that the gift tax
is supplementary to the estate tax; that the two are in pari materia and
must be construed together; and that the completeness of gift for gift
tax purposes was to be determined by applying the test used in deciding
whether the donor had retained an interest such that it became subject
to the estate tax upon its extinguishment at death. Concerning the first
reason given, the Court said:
"There are .other persuasive reasons why the taxpayer's contention cannot be sustained. By§ 315(b), § 324, and more specifically by § SIO of the 1932 Act, the donee of any gift is made
personally liable for the tax to the extent of the value of the gift
if the tax is not paid by the donor. It can hardly be supposed that
Congress intended to impose personal liability upon the donee of
a gift of property, so incomplete that he might be deprived of it
by the donor the day after he had paid the tax. Further, § 321
(b) (I) exempts from the tax, gifts to religious, charitable and
educational corporations and the like. A gift would seem not to be
complete for purposes of the tax, where the donor has reserved
the power to determine whether the donees ultimately entitled
to receive and enjoy the property are of such a class as to exempt
the gift from taxation. Apart from other considerations we should
hesitate to accept as correct a construction under which it could
plausibly be maintained that a gift in trust for the benefit of charitable corporations is then complete so that the taxing statute becomes operative and the gift escapes the tax even though the
donor should later change the beneficiaries to the non-exempt class
through exerdse of a power to modify the trust in any way not
beneficial to himself." 112
In the Sanford case~ power to modify the gift was retained in the donor.
In the hypothetical case above stated, power to revoke was not in the
donor-husband, but was in the wife of the donor. However, the effect
of a revocation, whether it be by the donor-husband or by the wife,
would be exactly the same. The property would have thus been reclaimed for the benefit of the community. This appears, therefore, to
be an even stronger case for holding the gift incomplete and nontaxable than the Sanford case, for in that case the property could under
no circumstances be reclaimed to the donor's estate. The above quoted
language from the Sanford case appears applicable in toto to a gift by
the husband of community property, voidable by the non-consenting
wife.
112

Id. at 46.
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Changing separate property into community property by gift.
The Regulations specifically provide that no gift tax results from a
transfer of separate property of either spouse into community property.11a
3. Release of non-earning spouse's interest in community property
to the earning spouse. One method of avoiding the discrimination which
the estate tax amendment causes in the event of the death of the nonearning spouse leaving the earning spouse surviving, is for the nonearning spouse to make an inter vivos release to the earning spouse of
his or her interest in the community property. As pointed out in the
section discussing this problem with reference to the estate tax,114 onehalf of the community property is, because of the power of testamentary
disposition, taxable to the estate, whereas in a similar situation in a
non-community property state, there would be no estate tax. Suppose
,the non-earning spouse, in anticipation of death, were to make an inter
vivos transfer of his or her interest in the community property to the
earning spouse. What would be the tax incidence?
(a) There appears to be no basis for inclusion of the transferred
property in the gross estate of the transferor on death, either under
section 8 r r ( c) of the code as a gift of community property in contemplation of death, or under section 8rr(d) as a transfer subject to a
power of revocation. Section 8 r r ( d) ( 5) excepts from the operation
of section 8 r r ( c) and section _8 r r ( d) such part of any transferred
property "as may be shown to have been received as compensation for
personal secvices actually rendered by the surviving spouse or derived
originally from such compensation or from separate property of the
surviving spouse." By definition this hypothetical case is one in which
the interest transferred was to the spouse who ear.ned it, and is thus
clearly within the terms of the exception qupted.
(b) No estate tax would accrue under code section 8 r r ( e) ( 2), for
the transferor would have no remaining interest .in any community
property, having made an inter vivos transfer of his or her entire interest. Thus, he would have no power of testamentary disposition over
any property.115
( c) Likewise there would seem to be no gift tax under the terms
of code section rooo(d), as interpreted by the Regulations.116 What
113
TREAS, REG, 108, § 86.2(c), infra, note II6.
2.

114

See discussion pertaining to footnotes 99 to 101 inclusive, supra.
Professor McAllister's comment, "The Estate and Gift Tax Amendments,
Revenue Act of 1942," 31 CAL. L. REv. 60 at 71 (1942).
116
TREAS. REG. 108, § 86.2(c) (1943). This section provides in part:"... The
entire property comprising the gift is prima facie a gift of the husband, but any portion
115
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would be the value of such a gift? The value of the interest of the
husband in the property after the property has been given to him is
roo per cent. Hence there would be no gift by him. None of the
property was economically attributable to the wife. Therefore there
was no gift by her.
This would seem, therefore, to be one way in which community
property spouses might mitigate the discriminatory e:ffects produced by
the estate tax amendment, when it appears that the wife, a non-earner,
will predecease her husband. Admittedly, however, not a "satisfactory"
manner of procedure for the tax-conscious person seeking to act with
foresight of result!
4. Transfer of community interest to non-earning spouse. A transfer to the non-earner of the community interest of the earning spouse
would result in a taxable gift under the Regulations, regardless of
whether the earner was husband or wife. In each such case, the application of the Regulations would result in the assessment of a gift tax
against the transferor.
S. Trans/er by spouses to third person. A gift of community property to a third pe!-'son is the precise situation to which section, rooo( d)
of the code was designed to apply. Such a gift "shall be considered"
the gift of the husband, unless the wife shows that she was the earner
of the donated property, or that the gift res was the proceeds of her
earnings or of her separate property.
6. Conversion of tenancy in community to tenancy in connnon.
Suppose a husband and wife possess, as community property, the sum
thereof which is shown to be economically attributable to the wife as prescribed in the
preceding sentence constitutes a gift of the wife.
"The rule stated in the preceding paragraph applies alike to a transfer, by way
of community property to a third party or third parties, to a division of such community property between husband and wife into separate property of each, and to a
transfer by the husband and wife of any part of such community property into the
separate property either of the husband or of the wife, or into a joint estate or tenancy
by the entirety of both spouses. In all of such cases the value of the property so
transferred or so divided, as the case may be, is a gift by the husband to the extent that
it exceeds the aggregate amount of the value of that portion which is shown to be
economically attributable to the wife, as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, and of
the value of the husband's interest in such property after such transfer or division.
The value of the property so transferred or so divided, as the case may be, is a gift
by the wife to the extent that the portion of such value which is shown to be economically attributable to her, as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, exceeds the
value of her interest in such property after such transfer or such division ..•. No gift
tax results from a transfer on or after January 1, 1943, of the separate property of
either spouse into community property."
Also see Taylor, "Comments on the Federal Esta_te & Gift Tax Provisions Re
Community Property," 19 CAL. ST. B. J. 106 (1944).
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of $rno,ooo, which they wish to donate to son D. It has been seen
that a direct transfer of the entire sum would result in a taxable gift
assessed to husband. Could the gift tax rates in the higher brackets
be avoided by carrying out a plan under which the husband and wife
would convert their $ rno,ooo community funds into funds held by
them as tenants in common, thus permitting them to make separate
gifts to D of $50,000 each? In other words, does a conversion of community property into property held by the same spouses as tenants in
common result in a taxable gift? The Regulations state that section
moo( d) applies "to a transfer by the husband and wife of any part
of such community property . . . into a joint estate or tenancy by the
entirety of both spouses." However, when an attempt is made to determine the value of the gift for tax purposes, one finds it difficult to
apply the provisions of the Regulations to the case. The difficulty is
inherent in the fact that the spouses own exactly the same percentages
and interests in the property after the conversion as before. No property changed hands; merely the form of tenancy was changed. Admittedly this is a formalistic approach, and an undesirable result, for
it permits by indirection that which is prohibited directly. Certainly it
would constitute an "evasion" of the spirit and purpose of the amendment were husband and wife permitted to make such a conversion prior
to giving the $rno,ooo to D; and one may safely as_sume that the
courts would look with disfavor upon such an attempt. However, the
suggestion has been made by one writer that this may be possible,111
117 Altman, "Community Property and the Gift Tax," 21 TAXES ·429 (1943).
The author states, id. at 43 l: "There are 1,000 shares of stock, all community property. By agreement husband and wife convert them into 1,000 shares of stock held by '
them as tenants in common. Is there a gift within the meaning of the gift tax provisions?
"The wife has in effect received 500. shafes freed of the husband's community
property interest, management and control. So also has the husband received 500 shares
freed of the wife's community property interest.••. The only provision under which
the transaction could be considered would be that under which a transfer for less than
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth is deemed for gift tax
purposes to' be pro tanto a gift.
"From the standpoint of that provision what is the transaction? The husband has
released to the wife his community property interest, plus th~ right of management
and control, in 500 shares. The consideration he has received is a release of the wife's
community property interest in the other 500 shares. Thus as far as the community
property interests are concerned the transaction cancels out. The excess of the transfer
by the husband over the consideration received is therefore the management and .
control of 500 shares••••
"The next problem is that of valuation. Property as such can be valued. But
what is the value of the right of management and control taken alone • • • ?
"There may be a solution, but it is one for Congress and not for the co'urts. It
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and it appears to be a situation requiring further clarification in the
Regulations.

D. Resume of Gift Tax Developments
r. Prior to the Revenue Act of I 942 the rule became established
that gifts of community property were considered to be one-half from
each spouse. This was an extension of the same principles that had
been applied to income taxation of community earnings and estate
taxation of community property on the death of one of the spouses.
2. (a) As a part of a movement to eradicate the advantage formerly
held by residents of community property jurisdictions, the:re was included in the r 942 Revenue Act an amendment providing that all
gi£ts of community property were to be considered gifts of the husband
unless the gift res was shown to be economically attributable to the
wife.
,
(b) According to the Regulations, this rule is applicable alike to
transfers to third parties, and to various transfers or divisions between
husband and wife, except that it is specifically provided that no gift tax
results from a transfer of separate property of either spouse into community property.

CONCLUSIONS

r. The application of community property concepts to the federal
taxation of incomes has resulted in an advantage to spouses who are
fortunate enough to be residents of jurisdictions in which community
property is recognized. As the situation now stands, two married
couples with equal incomes and otherwise identically situated, will pay
different taxes if one lives in the city of Vancouver, Washington and
the other in the city of Portland, Oregon, less than a dozen miles .distant. That the incidence of federal taxation in the United States should
· not depend upon the accident of residence in a particular locality seems
patent from a mere statement of the proposition.
While it appears possible to remove this inequality either by legislation or judicial decision, the former way appears to involve fewer
difficulties. Specific amendatory legislation would eliminate problems
of retroactivity and avoid the necessity of overruling previous decisions,
always a distasteful task to the Courts. Furthermore, legislative acdoes not lie in the present form of the community property provision of the federal
gift tax laws."
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ceptance of a proposal for mandatory joint returns by husband and wife
would not only solve the community property problem, but since it
would act on husband and wife as a unit, would eliminate other forms
of tax minimization by spouses-such as family -partnerships.ma
Judicial change seems possible, howeyer. On occasion the Supreme
Court has overruled previously controlling decisions 118 and murmurings of discontent with the now leading case of Poe v. Seaborn 119 have
been noted. To the objection that judicial change brings about bothersome problems of retroactivity, may be interposed a suggestion that
judicial repeal, like legislative amendment, may be made to apply only
prospectively by the court.120 Approval of this doctrine may be found
in the decisions of two of our state courts,121 and its application to the
problem at hand would be a complete answer to the objection of retroactivity.
2. The estate tax amendments applicable to community property
seem to have achieved their purpose of eliminating the previously
existing inequality in favor of community spouses; but a new inequality
has been created in those situations where the non-earning spouse predeceased the earning spouse. If, in the application of the federal
revenue laws, geographical equality of result is desirable, is not a
further amendment indicated.122
3. In the gift tax sphere specific situations can be assumed in which
the application of existing Regulations appears difficult; however, as
experience with this amendment is gained it is to be assumed that these
problems will be clarified. They do not appear to be of sufficient magnitude to warrant legislative attention.
117
a As this article goes to press, legislative relief is being sought in Congress. There
is now pending in the United States Senate a bill described as follows: "A bill granting to married persons living in non-community property states who .file joint returns
the same income tax treatment as if they lived in community property states." S.B.
649, introduced February 24, 1947, by Senator Tydings.
118
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940).
119
282 U.S. IOI, 51 s. Ct. 58 (1930).
120
Shartel, "Stare Decisis-A Practical View," 17 AM. Jun. Soc. J. 6 (1933);
see also an article by the editors entitled "Sensible View of Stare Decisis Gains Ground,"
23 AM. Jun. Soc. J. 32 (1939); Green, "The Development of the Doctrine of
Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should Be Applied," 40 ILL. L. REv. 303
at 323 (1946).
121
Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 194, 7 P.
(2d) 919 (1932), [sustained in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Re.fining
Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S. Ct. 145 (1932)]; Payne v. City of Covington, 276 Ky.
380, 123 S.W. (2d) 1045 (1938).
122 See suggestion discussed in connection'with footnote 101, supra.

